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Toner: Liability of Oil Companies for the Torts of Service Station Opera

COMMENT
LIABILITY OF OIL COMPANIES FOR THE
TORTS OF SERVICE STATION OPERATORS*
The purpose of this comment is to examine the tests used
by courts in determining when a nonnegligent oil company is
liable for the torts of its service station operators.' When
suing an oil company, the plaintiff usually claims that the
service station operator is the company's servant 2 or that the
company is estopped from denying that the operator is its
servant.' This comment will discuss the test used by the courts
to distinguish between servants and independent contractors
and the test used to determine if the company is estopped. Using Professor Guido Calabresi's suggested goals of a system
of tort law,' an attempt will be made to show that the courts'
tests are not sound bases for decision and that they often lead
to the wrong outcome. Finally, suggestions will be made in
regard to the manner in which these cases might be approached
in order to accomplish these goals and policies.
*

The author acknowledges the helpful criticisms of this paper made by Dr.
James Pikl, Head of the Department of Economics at the University of
Wyoming.

1. Other articles which have dealt with various aspects of this problem
include: Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 457 (1988);
Comment, Master and Servant-The Filling Station Operator as Independent Contractor, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 1063 (1940); Comment, AgencyLiability of National Oil Companies for Acts of Service Station Operators,
43 Ky. L.J. 543 (1955); Comment, Liability of a Franchisorfor Acts of
the Franchisee, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 143 (1968); Comment, Torts-Liability
of Lessor-Lease of a "Company" Filling Station, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 385
(1942); Comment, Liability of Oil Company for Its Lessees Torts, 1965
U. ILL. L.F. 915 (1965); Comment, A Franchisor'sLiability for the Torts of
his Franchisee, 5 U. SAN FRANCIsco L. REV. 118 (1970); Comment, Dealer
Franchising in the Gasoline Industry: Current Developments, 4 U. SAN
FRANCISCO L. REV. 65 (1969); Comment, Tort Liability of Oil Companies
for Acts of Service Station Operators, 3 VARD. L. REV. 597 (1950); Comment, Vicarious Liability of Filling Station Oil Companies Under Respondeat Superior, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 88 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533 (1939); Clark v.
Texaco, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
3. See, e.g., Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971); Standard Oil
Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 62, 1 So. 2d 29 (1941); Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1960); Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa
163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939).
4.

CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-33 (1970).
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The courts have generally approached this problem by
deciding whether the service station operator is the company's
servant acting within the scope of his employment or an independent contractor.' When the operator is classified as a
servant, the company is held liable.' When he is classified as
an independent contractor, the company is not held. As a
basis of classification, the courts have adopted the control
test.8 If the oil company controls the details of the operation
of the station or the physical conduct of the operator in performing his duties, the operator is classified as a servant.'
If the company cannot control the means and methods of operating the station and cannot control the operator's physical
conduct, the operator is classified as an independent contractor,"0 and the company is not liable for his torts.
5. Other theories of liability have been pressed. These include: Premises
liability of the lessor, Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240
P.2d 580 (1952); Drum v. Pure Oil Co., 184 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1966) ; Elkins
v. Husky Oil Co., 153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329 (1969); and the nondelegable
duty and inherently dangerous activities exceptions to the rule of nonliability for the torts of independent contractors, Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815
(Okla. 1963); Lollis v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 285 S.W.2d 249
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955). The problem of whether the operator's act was
within the scope of his employment has been raised in only a few cases,
Monetti v. Standard Oil Co., 195 So. 89 (La. 1940); Becker v. Aschen,
344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533 (1939); Buck v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y.,
224 App. Div. 299, 230 N.Y.S. 192 (1928); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Guffey, 129 Tex. 293, 102 S.W.2d 408 (1937).
6. Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524, 158 S.W.2d 171
(1942); Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533 (1939); Coffman
v. Shell Petroleum, 228 Mo. App. 727, 71 S.W.2d 97 (1934) ; Greene v.
Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931); Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C.
12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939); Clark v. Texaco, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d
995 (1949); Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
7. Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Apple v.
Standard Oil, Division of American Oil Co., 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Calif.
1969); Ark. Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684 (1940) ;
Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214 (Del. 1965); Reynolds v. Skelly Oil
Co., 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939) ; Grieving v. La Plante, 156 Kan.
196, 131 P.2d 898 (1942); Donovan v. Standard Oil Co., 197 So. 320 (La.
1940); Brown v. Standard Oil Co., 309 Mich. 101, 14 N.W.2d 797 (1944);
Shell Petroleum v. Linham, 163 So. 839 (Miss. 1935); Elkins v. Husky Oil
Co., 153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329 (1969) ; Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 215 N.C.
422, 2 S.E.2d 26 (1939); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963) ; Green v.
Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207 (1964); Westre v. Debuhr,
82 S.D. 276, 144 N.W.2d 734 (1966); Texas Co. v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468,
168 S.W.2d 632 (1943).
8. See supra notes 6 and 7.
9. See, e.g., Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524, 158 S.W.2d
171 (1942) ; Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
10. See, e.g., Ark. Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684
(1940) ; Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214 (Del. 1965).
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The relationships between the oil companies and the service station operators fall into three categories :1"
1. Company operated stations-the oil company owns or
leases the station, and the station is operated by employees who are paid on a salary basis. In these cases,
the master-servant relationship is not denied, and the
oil company is liable for the torts of the operators.
These stations accounted for only 2% of the national
total in 1957,2 and they are now used primarily for

training operators, testing merchandising methods,
and promotional purposes.'"
2. Dealer operated stations-the company owns or leases
the station and rents it along with the necessary equipment to the dealer. This arrangement usually involves
a lease, equipment rental agreement, and a supply
contract. 4
3. "Contractor" stations-the station operator owns or
leases the facilities and simply has a supply contract
and possibly an equipment rental agreement with the
oil company.'
These last two categories are the areas in which the problem of the oil company's liability arises. The courts generally
look to the terms of these different agreements to discover
whether the necessary control exists. These agreements usually provide that :1"

1. The lease or supply agreement is for one year initially
and thereafter from year to year subject to cancella11.

McLEAN AND HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES

476-8

(1954).
12.

CHAZEAU

AND

KAHN,

INTEGRATION

COMPETITION IN

AND

THE PETROLEUM

INDUSTRY 426 (1959).
MCLEAN AND HAIGH, supra note 11, at 492.

13.
14. Id. at 477.
15. Id. at 478.
16. The sources for these standard leases and dealer agreements are:
Conoco--RoSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING 329-42 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as "Conoco Lease" and "Conoco Motor Fuels Agreement").
Sinclair-Hearingson the Use of Games of Chance in Gasoline Marketing
and Their Impact upon Small Business before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the House Select Committee on Small Busi-

ness, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 41-3 (1968)
Lease").

(hereafter referred to as "Sinclair

Texaco-Hearings on the Use of Games of Chance in Gasoline Marketing
and Their Impact upon Small Business before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the House Select Committee on Small Busi-

ness, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 41-3 (1968) (hereafter referred to as "Texaco
Lease").
American Oil Co.-Hearings on Gasoline Marketing Practices before Subcommittee Number Four on Distribution Problems of the House Select
Committee on Small Business, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1179-84 (1965) (hereafter referred to as "Amoco Lease" and "Amoco Dealer Agreement").
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tion by written notice given ten to sixty days prior to
the date of termination. 7
2. The operator will diligently promote the sale of the
company's products."
3. The operator will keep the premises clean and attractive.1 9
4. The operator will use the premises for service station
purposes and not conduct additional business thereon
without company consent."
5. The operator will pay all licenses, taxes, and operating expenses.2 1
6. The operator will pay as rent a certain number of cents
per gallon; however, a certain maximum and minimum
amount of rent is usually set.2"
7. The operator may only sell the oil company's product
under its trademark, and, if he ceases to buy the company's products, he must remove all company signs
and trademarks."
8. The oil company will not be liable for any injuries
arising from the operation of the station, and the operator agrees to indemnify the company for any amount
it may be required to pay."
9. The operator agrees to buy a certain amount of the
company's product."5
10. The operator is an independent businessman, and the
oil company has no right of control over the business
or operation of the station.2"
11. The lease or sales agreement may be cancelled if :2
a. The operator fails to carry out all of his covenants.
b. The operator fails to pay rent in any period.
17. Conoco Lease § 7; Texaco Lease § 2; Amoco Lease, first para.
18. Sinclair Lease § 3; Conoco Lease § 3D.
19. Conoco Lease §§ BA, 6; Sinclair Lease §§ 4, 8; Texaco Lease § 5; Amoco
Lease § 2.
20. Conoco Lease § 3E; Texaco Lease § 4; Amoco Lease § 4.
21. Conoco Lease § 6; Sinclair Lease § 9; Texaco Lease §§ 6, 9; Amoco Lease

§ 2.

22. Conoco Lease § 4; Sinclair Lease § 6; Texaco Lease § 3; Amoco Lease, first
para.
23. Conoco Lease § 5; Amoco Dealer Agreement § 7.
24. Conoco Lease § 8; Sinclair Lease §§ 10-11; Amoco Lease § 3.
25. Conoco Motor Fuels Agreement § 1; Texaco Agreement of Sale § 7; Amoco
Dealer Agreement § 1.
26. Conoco Lease § 8; Amoco Lease § 7.
27. Conoco Lease § 7B; Sinclair Lease § 23; Texaco Lease § 10; Amoco Lease

§ 9.
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c. The station is abandoned for two or three days.
d. The operator becomes insolvent or bankrupt.
12. The operator will honor company credit cards.28
13. The company has the right to inspect the premises and
equipment. 9
In the search for the necessary control, the courts then
consider the terms of the franchise's agreement, factors such
as advertising and telephone listings, ard whether the company has actual control over the operations or just the right of
control." The courts work through lists of various sizes and
enumerate the facts which they believe show the presence or
absence of control.
Interestingly, the presence or absence of no one fact or
combination of facts necessarily means that the operator will
be classified as an independent contractor rather than a
servant. The following facts are often discussed in the cases:
1. indemnity provisions,3 '
2. agreements to honor company credit cards,82
3. inspections of the station and operational suggestions
made by company representatives,"
28. Conoco Lease § 3F.
29. Amoco Dealer Agreement § 7.
30. Schrader, Agency-Liability of National Oil Companies for Acts of
Service Station Operators,43 KY. L.J. 543 (1955).
31. Held to be servant: Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524,
158 S.W.2d 171 (1942); Coffman v. Shell Petroleum, 228 Mo. App. 727,
71 S.W.2d 97 (1934). Held to be independent contractor: Ark. Fuel Oil Co.
v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684 (1940); Westre v. Debuhr, 82
S.D. 276, 144 N.W.2d 734 (1966).
32. Held to be servant: Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524,
158 S.W.2d 171 (1942); Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533
(1939); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931); Hubbard
v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939); Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d
907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Held to be independent contractor: Smith v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Miller v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959); Apple v. Standard Oil, Division of
American Oil Co., 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Calif. 1969); Ark. Fuel Oil Co.
v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684 (1940); Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co.,
215 N.C. 422, 2 S.E.2d 26 (1939); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963).
33. Held to be servant: Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524,
158 S.W.2d 171 (1942); Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941); Gulf Refining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933). Held to be independent contractor: Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co.,
346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Miller v. Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d
114 (5th Cir. 1959); Apple v. Standard Oil, Division of American Oil Co.,
307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Calif. 1969). Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.
2d 375, 240 P.2d 580 (1952) ; Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163,
287 N.W. 823 (1939); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963); Texas Co.
v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943).
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4. provisions requiring the operators to hire their own
employees and set their own hours of operation,34
5. provisions allowing termination at will or with 10
days notice,"5
6. exclusive sale of the company's products, either by
agreement or practice,"8
7. price recommendations made by the company."
As an examination of footnotes 31 to 37 will indicate, none of
these facts is determinative of the company's liability or nonliability. For example, an agreement to indemnify is as likely
to be found where the operator is held to be a servant as it is
where he is held to be an independent contractor."8
It also appears that there is no basis for distinguishing
the cases on the grounds that the plaintiff was probably relying on the oil company rather than the operator when he decided to deal with the particular station. These plaintiffs,
who have been allowed to recover even though they probably
did not rely on the fact that the oil company was operating the
station, include those who were injured when walking by the
station and the operator's employees who were injured in
34. Held to be a servant: Monetti v. Standard Oil Co., 195 So. 89 (La. 1940) ;
Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939). Held to be independent
contractor: Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965);
Drum v. Pure Oil Co., 184 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1966); Donovan v. Standard
Oil Co., 197 So. 320 (La. 1940); Brown v. Standard Oil Co., 309 Mich.
101, 14 N.W.2d 797 (1944); Rothrock v. Roberson, 214 N.C. 26, 197 S.E.
568 (1938); Green v. Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207
(1964) ; Westre v. Debuhr, 82 S.D. 276, 144 N.W.2d 734 (1966).
35. Held to be servant: Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533 (1939);
Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Gulf Refining
Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Held to be independent contractor: Ark. Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d
684 (1940); Shell Petroleum v. Linham, 163 So. 839 (Miss. 1935); Rothrock
v. Roberson, 214 N.C. 26, 197 S.E. 568 (1938).
36. Held to be servant: Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524,
158 S.W.2d 171 (1942); Coffman v. Shell Petroleum, 228 Mo. App. 727,
71 S.W.2d 97 (1934); Cooper v. Graham, 231 S.C. 404, 98 S.E.2d 843
(1957) ; Texas Co. v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Gulf
Refining Co. v. Rogers, 57 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Held to be
independent contractor: Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th
Cir. 1965); Donovan v. Standard Oil Co., 197 So. 320 (La. 1940); Shell
Petroleum v. Linham, 163 So. 839 (Miss. 1935); Elkins v. Husky Oil Co.,
153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329 (1969) ; Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 215 N.C. 422,
2 S.E.2d 26 (1939); Green v. Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d
207 (1964).
37. Held to be servant: Becker v. Aschen, 344 Mo. 1107, 131 S.W.2d 533 (1939);
Coffman v. Shell Petroleum, 228 Mo. App. 727, 71 S.W.2d 97 (1934); Cooper
v. Graham, 231 S.C. 404, 98 S.E.2d 843 (1957); Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C.
12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939) ; Clark v. Texaco, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964). Held to be independent operator: Elkins v. Husky Oil Co.,
153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329 (1969).
38. See supra note 31.
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their work." Similar plaintiffs have, however, been denied
recovery.4" Where reliance on the company would be likely,
as for example where the plaintiff was from out of state or
is held liable in some cases4 and in
out of town, the company
42
not.
is
it
other cases
The courts may, of course, differ on the application of
principles of law to the same facts; however, the almost complete lack of any correspondence between sets of facts and the
results of these cases indicates that this is not just an occasional instance of disagreement. Rather, it seems that control
is not the determinative factor in these cases.
Mechem suggests that the courts stress the control factor
according to their predilection for or against allowing recovery.4 ' If so, the search should be for the source of these predilections. The courts, however, have not been helpful in this
regard, for they almost universally fail to articulate any policy
basis for their decisions. The most extensive policy explanation encountered in these cases was in Levine v. Standard Oil
Co., Inc., in Kentucky.44 The court held that the operator was
an independent contractor and said, "A contrary ruling would
upset without any sound reason the foundations of innumerable business relationships."
The courts appear to be
discussions of control. The
appear to help in answering
should take money from the
plaintiff.

getting bogged down in esoteric
control test, however, does not
the question of why the courts
oil company and give it to the

39. Cooper v. Graham, 231 S.C. 404, 98 S.E.2d 843 (1957); Hubbard v. Rowe,
192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin,
148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
40. Ark. Fuel Oil Co. v. Scaletta, 200 Ark. 645, 140 S.W.2d 684 (1940); Hayes
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 375, 240 P.2d 580 (1952); Brown v.
Standard Oil Co., 309 Mich. 101, 14 N.W.2d 797 (1944); Shell Petroleum
v. Linham, 163 So. 839 (Miss. 1935).
41. Clark v. Texaco, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Texas Co.
v. Freer, 151 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
42. Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Miller v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959); Apple v. Standard
Oil, Division of American Oil Co., 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
Elkins v. Husky Oil Co., 153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329 (1969).
43. MECIIEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 441 (1952).
44. 249 Miss. 651, 163 So. 2d 750 (1964).
45. Id. at 752.
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Most courts, which have decided cases dealing with the
oil companies' liability for service station operators' torts,
have not found the necessary control and have held the operator to be an independent contractor." In response to this
plaintiffs have begun to rely on theories of agency by estoppel
and apparent authority. While the Restatement of Agency
recognizes a distinction between these two concepts,47 the
courts tend to blend them into one test. Essentially the courts
look for the following: the "principal" manifests to a third
person that another is his servant; the third person reasonably
relies on this manifestation; and the manifestation causes him
to deal with the "servant" whereupon he is injured by the
"servant's" tortious conduct."8
A division of authority appears to be developing in these
paralleling the courts' division over the application of the
control test. The plaintiff usually claims that he was induced
to deal with the service station operator because of the presence of company signs, trademarks, uniforms, and nationwide
advertising. 9 One line of cases holds that the company is estopped because as a matter of law the court cannot say that it
is unreasonable for the plaintiff to rely on these signs as
representations that the operator is the oil companys' servant." A larger number of courts have held as a matter of
law that it is unreasonable for the plaintiff to rely on these
signs as indicia of a master-servant relationship because it is
a "matter of common knowledge" that these signs are displayed by independent dealers and that they only indicate that
the oil company's products are sold at the station.5 '
46. See Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 457 (1938).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 at 32 (1958).
48. Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971).
49. The RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY recognizes that the manifestation may be
made to the community by signs and advertising. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 8 at 31 (1958).

50. See, e.g., Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 48; Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry,
241 Ala. 62, 1 So. 2d 29 (1941).
51. Miller v. Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959); Apple v.
Standard Oil, Division of American Oil Co., 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Cal.
1969); Drum v. Pure Oil Co., 184 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1966); Reynolds v.
Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939); Elkins v. Husky Oil
Co., 153 Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 329 (1969) ; Westre v. Debuhr, 82 S.D. 276,
144 NW,2d 734 (1966).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/10

8

Toner: Liability of Oil Companies for the Torts of Service Station Opera

1972

COMMN

271

Previously most courts were saying, "Reasonable men
could not possibly find that there was control." Now most of
them are saying, "Reasonable men could not possibly differ
on the conclusion that this reliance is unreasonable." Again,
it appears that the courts' test does not explain why the courts
should not take money from the oil companies.
PUBLIC POICY
As the courts check through their list of facts which indicate whether there is or is not control, and as they declare
what is or is not a matter of common knowledge, one gets the
impression that they are ignoring the fact that by their decisions they either take money from the oil companies or they
leave the plaintiffs to bear their losses. In either case, the
courts are performing the function of loss allocation,5 2 although they apparently do not choose explicitly to recognize
this function.
Justice Blume stated in Blessing v. Pitman3 that respondeat superioris applied "as a matter of public policy and economic requirements." 5 If there are policy and economic
reasons for not taking money from the oil company in order
to compensate the injured plaintiff, these reasons are not very
well explained by simply stating that there was no control or
that reliance was unreasonable. If the courts would look to the
policy implications of their decisions and acknowledge that
they are allocating losses, their holdings would be understandable and their assumptions and predilections would be available for analysis and criticism.
In performing their function of loss allocation the courts
should consider what impact their decision will have on different goals and public policies, for each time they decide
whether or not to pay an injured person for his loss they will
be promoting or crippling some public policy.
The courts' decisions in the area will be analyzed in terms
of Professor Calabresi's framework of goals which a system
52. PROSSER, TORTS § 2, at 6 (3d ed. 1964).
53. 70 Wyo. 416, 251 P.2d 243 (1952).
54. Id. at 246.
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of tort law should seek to accomplish." He suggests that the
goals of a system of accident law should be:
1. Justice.5" Calabresi recognizes the ambiguous nature
of this goal; however, he treats it primarily as a restraint on the accomplishment of his second goal of
the reduction of accident costs by requiring consistency and nonviolation of the moral framework of the
society.
2. Reduction of Accident Costs.57 There are some activities, for example driving, which are so socially desirable that we will not give them up simply because they
cause injuries. At some point the societal costs of
avoiding accidents, e.g., by giving up driving and all
the benefits dependent upon it, exceed the societal
costs of the injuries themselves. In a sense we actually
decide for injuries when the point is reached where
the societal benefits of continuing the activity which
causes the injuries outweigh the societal costs of the
injuries. 8 To reach this point of an optimum level of
injuries, three subgoals may have to be achieved:
a. PrimaryAccident Cost Reduction.9 This requires
a reduction in the number and severity of accidents.
This may be done in two ways:
1) Specific Deterrence-costs may be reduced by
forbidding specific acts thought to cause accidents.
2) General Deterrence-cost may be reduced by
making activities which cause accidents more
expensive and thereby less attractive to those
who wish to engage in them.
b. Secondary Accident Cost Reduction."° This subgoal aims at reducing the societal costs of accidents
by:
55.

CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-33 (1970).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 24, 292.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 3P-40,
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1) Loss Spreading-societal cost may be reduced
by distributing the loss widely rather than leaving it on the individual. This is based on the
idea that taking a large sum from one person is
more likely to result in economic dislocation
and, therefore, avoidable social costs than is
distributing the loss widely.
2) Deep Pocket Method-societal costs can be reduced by placing the losses on those who are
least likely to suffer economic dislocation as a
result of bearing them.
c. Tertiary Cost Reduction. 1 Societal costs may be
reduced by reducing the cost of administering our
treatment of accidents.
The courts' decisions in cases involving suits by an injured person against a nonnegligent oil company should serve
to accomplish these goals. The goal of reducing the costs of
accidents and its three subgoals will be considered and, using
these goals as a framework, an attempt will be made to determine whether the injured plaintiff, the oil company, or the
service station operator should bear the loss. The goal of
justice will be treated, as Calabresi suggests, as a restraint on
the achievement of these other goals.
PRIMARY ACCIDENT COST REDUCTION

In order to achieve a reduction in the number and
severity of these accidents through general deterrence, the
costs of these accidents must be internalized, that is, the cost
of engaging in the injury-causing activity must reflect the
cost of the accidents. 2 If this is done, those who wish to engage in the activity must evaluate this cost and either decide
not to engage in the activity, decide to try to reduce the cost
by preventing the injury, or decide simply that it can economically absorb the cost. If the activity causing the accident can
externalize the cost, that is, force some other activity to pay
this cost, the cost of engaging in the injury-causing activity
61. Id at 28.
62. Id. at 144,
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will not reflect the accident costs. Thus people in choosing to
engage in the activity will not have to consider the costs of
these accidents, and they will not be deterred from entering
the market, and the number and severity of accidents would
not be decreased by the market's mechanism.
If the cost of the injury is placed on the injured person,
the activity of dealing with service stations and buying petroleum products will reflect this cost. It seems, however, that
this cost would probably be externalized by the injured person.
In order to account for the costs, the injured person must
have some way of foreseeing and evaluating the risks involved
in the activity." The injured person is better aware than the
oil company or the service station operator of the impact an
accident would have on his particular economic position, but
he probably has inadequate knowledge to be able to accurately
evaluate the risks involved in dealing with service stations,
and he does not have easy access to such information. Since
he cannot accurately evaluate these risks and costs, he will not
properly account for them in determining whether to enter
the market. Since the injured persons cannot properly evaluate these risks and costs, they will not secure the necessary
funds to compensate themselves for their injuries. This leads
to externalization by transfer. 4 The cost is then passed on
to the taxpayers through various welfare and social insurance
programs. The market mechanism will, therefore, not operate
to reduce the number and severity of these accidents.
If the oil company is held liable, it cannot externalize the
costs. First, there would be no externalization through inadequate knowledge. The oil companies are able to evaluate the
risks of their business and accurately determine what the costs
will be. Secondly, unlike the injured person without insurance, the oil companies do have money which the courts can
take away. If they are held liable, they stand to lose money,
and they will take steps to minimize that loss. By allocating
the costs to the oil companies, the courts will force the companies to decide whether it will cost the companies less to take
steps to reduce injuries by tightening inspection procedures
63. Id. at 148.
64. Id. at 147.
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and company operating standards, to eliminate the franchise
system of marketing completely, to insure against these injuries with a private insurer, to self-insure by raising prices,
or to drop out of the market. At the present time the companies are often allowed to externalize these costs because they
are not held liable. Therefore, they do not have to enter into
these considerations as to how they might reduce the costs of
accidents. If the courts hold them liable, they must internalize
these costs.
The very existence of cases where the injured person is
suing the oil company indicates that some service station operators do not have to consider the costs of these injuries, for
they are probably judgment proof. The operator who does
not have sufficient funds to cover the injury externalizes the
cost of the injury and does not have to account for them in
deciding whether to enter the market as a service station operator. The operator, simply because he is constantly in the
environment of the station, would not externalize the costs
as a result of inadequate knowledge of and inability to evaluate the risks of his situation. The operator can externalize
the cost only if he is insolvent.
From the point of view of general deterrence, the oil
company is superior to the injured person and the potentially
insolvent service station operator as a loss bearer because it
must internalize these costs and decide how to deal with them.
If the service station operator is solvent, it becomes more difficult to choose between the oil company and the operator
as far as general deterrence is concerned. Both are able to
evaluate the risks of selling petroleum products, and both
would have to figure out how to deal with these costs most
economically.
If the loss is placed on the operators, they will probably
account for the costs of these accidents by insuring. Their
operating costs will be increased by this amount. This will
tend to force the careless operators out of the market, for their
operating costs will exceed those of the more careful operators
who will have to pay less to insure. By imposing this cost on
the operators, they will have to decide if it is economically
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972
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feasible to take steps to prevent injuries or if it is only economically feasible to drop out of the market.
The careless operators might also be eliminated by placing the loss on the oil company. Since the companies' insurance premiums will also increase according to the number and
severity of the accidents which occur at their stations, the
companies will either fire those especially careless operators
or revoke their franchising agreement. 5 Whether the costs
are imposed upon the oil companies or the operators, the subgoal of general deterrence would be achieved.
From the standpoint of reducing the number and severity
of accidents, it appears that the solvent service station operator is superior to the oil company. The company can, of
course, set certain standards for operating the station and
make inspections. The operator, however, is in a position to
go beyond minimum standards and adopt practises which will
lead to maximum safety. The operator is also constantly
around the station and so can evaluate the risks of his business
probably better than the oil company can by periodic inspections. Once the operator obtains insurance, he has internalized
the costs of these accidents, and the market mechanism will
operate to reduce the number of careless operators, and general deterrence will be accomplished.
Specific deterrence involves a collective or political decision to limit or restrict a particular activity, which, it is
judged, causes the injuries. It takes the choice of whether
or not to engage in the activity from the individual or company and out of the market economy. Specific deterrence
may play a role in this area through a statute requiring gas
to be sold only in certain containers or a statute requiring service station operators to have insurance before operating a
station in the state. The specific deterrence approach does
not answer the question of who would be the better risk bearer.
65. Professor Morris notes that the employer can fire an independent contractor
and thus discourage these injuries while a suit against a judgment proof
contractor would not accomplish this goal. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE LAW
OF TORTS 278 (1952).
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SECONDARY ACCIDENT COST REDUCTION

There are primarily two methods of reducing societal
costs resulting from accidents, loss distribution and the deep
pocket method. If the cost of the accident is left on the injured person, there would be no distribution of the loss unless
the injured person has insurance. There may be unnecessary
societal costs resulting from a requirement that the injured
person insure because he is not able, as is the oil company,
adequately to evaluate the risks of being harmed in the operation of the station. He may, therefore, purchase unnecessary
insurance. In addition, the administrative costs of insuring
that such a large number of people have insurance and of providing that insurance may be prohibitive. It seems then that
forcing the individual to bear the loss would produce the social
and economic disruption which this second goals seeks to
avoid. The individual is also more likely to suffer economic
dislocation as a result of bearing these losses than is an oil
company with the deep pocket.
The oil company can avoid these unnecessary societal
costs, caused by economic dislocation, by distributing most of
the costs. 6 It may do so by purchasing insurance, in which
case the cost of the insurance would be passed on to the consumer, or by self-insurance in which the oil company raises
the prices of its products to the operators and consumers.
Under the deep pocket method, placing the loss on the oil company is unlikely to cause the economic dislocations which
would result from leaving the losses on many injured individuals.
The service station operator theoretically can also insure
and raise his prices so as to distribute the loss. Because he is
more familiar with his station, the operator may be able to
evaluate the risks of his station better than the oil company
and thus avoid procuring unneeded insurance. This is counter66.

The demand for gasoline is fairly inelastic. The elasticity coefficient has
been estimated at about .5. An elasticity coefficient of 1.0 would mean
that the costs of these accidents would be shared equally between the oil
company and the consumers, i.e., the oil company could only pass along to
the consumers one-half of these costs by raising the price of gasoline. A
coefficient of .5 would mean that approximately three-fourths of the costs
could be passed on to the consumer. HAMILTON, COMPETITION IN OIL 30
MCALLISTER, THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
STATE OF WASHINGTON (1956).

(1958);
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balanced by the oil company's ability to inspect and set certain
rules for the operation of the station. The oil company may
also be able to insure more cheaply because it has the economic
power, which the operator lacks, to negotiate with insurance
companies for lower rates. Because it can offer a larger volune of business to the insurance companies, the oil company
need not settle for the adhesive contracts and fixed rate
schedules facing the individual operator. It appears that the
oil company, because of its countervailing power, probably can
insure more cheaply than the operator. This eliminates a false
cost of the activity of selling petroleum products at service
stations-the excess costs of insuring-from the prices of the
service station's products and services. 7 A reduction in the
societal costs of accidents thereby results.
A careless operator probably cannot either spread the loss
through an increase in prices or insurance without being
forced out of business. This is exactly what is desired under
the goal of general deterrence. The more careless operator
will probably have more accidents, and his insurance will cost
him more. He will evenutally be forced out of the market if
he cannot reduce these costs. From the point of view of general deterrence, this is desirable for it eliminates the careless operators. There appears, however, to be a conflict here
between general deterrence and the avoidance of social costs,
for squeezing the operator out of the market may result in
serious economic dislocations. In 1970 there was an annual
turnover of 25% of all gasoline station dealers, and 50% of
the dealers earned only $6,000 a year while working in excess
of 75 hours a week. The imposition of any additional cost
is likely to increase the rate of turnover. These figures also
indicate that the service station operator often does not have
a deep pocket. Unlike the oil company he is subject to economic dislocation by being forced to bear these added costs
for the individual operator would be destroyed by one uninsured loss.
67.

CALABRESI,

supra note 55, at 164.

68. Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business before the Subcommittee on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1970).
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It seems that for the purpose of secondary accident cost
reduction, the oil company would be the superior loss bearer.
Its economic power would enable it to eliminate any excess
insurance costs, and its deep pocket would prevent serious
economic dislocations. The counterweight, however, involves
the service station operator's potentially superior ability to
evaluate the risks of his station and to thus purchase only the
minimum necessary insurance.
TERTIARY ACCIDENT COST REDUCTION

Administration costs will probably be reduced from the
present by consistently placing the loss on any one of the three
possible loss bearers. If the injured person is forced to bear
the loss, he will not sue. If the oil company knows that it will
be held liable, it will settle. If only the station operator will
be held liable, the injured person will sue only if the operator
is solvent and in that case the operator would probably settle.
Presently, however, injured persons are encouraged to
instigate litigation, and the oil companies are encouraged not
to settle because of the indefiniteness of the courts' tests of
control and estoppel. The present system of decision-making
encourages litigation and increases administrative costs.

THE

BETTER

Loss

BEARER

This analysis suggests that the oil company is a better
loss bearer than the injured person and that by leaving this
loss on the individual a majority of the courts have wrongly
decided these cases. The goals of reducing the number and
severity of accidents and of reducing their societal costs will
not be accomplished by leaving the loss on the injured person.
These goals will, however, be served by holding the oil company liable. A potentially insolvent service station operator
will not be a good loss bearer because he will externalize the
costs of accidents and because he may defeat secondary accident cost reduction by simply dropping out of business when
sued.
It may be that if the operator had insurance, he would be
a better loss bearer from the point of view of general deterPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972
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rence than the oil company. As will be shown below, however,
it appears that holding the company liable will eventually lead
to the accompishment of the goal of reducing accident costs,
even if the solvent operator is the better loss bearer.
Errors may be made in allocating accident costs so that
the best loss bearer will not initially bear the loss. This may
be corrected by the market if the loss is allocated to what Calabresi calls "the best briber."" The best briber is the person
or organization that can find the best loss bearer and influence him by bribes to bear these costs. He is also the one who
can enter into these bribery transactions most cheaply.7" If
the service station operator is in fact the better loss bearer,
the oil company can induce him to insure and bear the loss by
perhaps offering reductions in rent and the prices of petroleum products.
Holding the oil company liable will probably ultimately
lead to a determination of whether the oil company or the
station operator is the better loss bearer. If the oil company
is held liable, they might choose to handle the cost by insuring
and by simply raising the prices of their products. They might
also rely on the indemnity clauses in their franchise agreements with the operators. Since a mere promise to indemnify
is worthless if the promiser is judgment-proof, the company
would probably move to make sure that the operator will have
a fund to make this promise meaningful. Presently, the oil
company franchising agreements generally do not provide for
any type of insurance. These clauses seem to be designed to
provide additional evidence to the courts that the operator is
an independent contractor and that, therefore, the company
should not be held liable. If the company knew that they would
have to bear this loss, they would probably move to make this
indemnity clause meaningful.
The companies would be attempting to transfer these
costs by this method. They cannot, however, externalize them
for, in demanding that the operators insure, the companies
will account for these because their contracts will be more
expensive for and less attractive to the operators. The com69. CALABRESI, supra note 55, at 150.
70. Id.
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panies will have more difficulty securing operators, and, if
this additional cost repels enough operators, the franchise
system of distributing petroleum products would become unworkable. This would be an indication that the operators are
not the best loss bearers. If, however, the operators do insure,
this indicates that it is economically feasible for them to continue in the franchise system. From a policy standpoint, forcing the operators to insure would also prevent the least desirable outcome of leaving the loss on the injured person.
JUSTICE

It does not seem that holding the oil companies liable in
these cases, because such a result serves the goal of reducing
accident costs, is somehow unfair. The oil companies derive
many benefits from these franchise arrangements. This system has largely insulated them from tort liability which would
have been imposed upon them if they had run their own stations. It has provided the oil companies with the desired degree of control over business without full investment responsibility, with credit card systems, and with a necessary outlet
for their products, which they must have to insure profits in
other branches of the industry.7 It seems that requiring the
oil companies to return some of these savings to those harmed
by the process of obtaining these benefits is not particularly
unfair or immoral. The courts' willingness to impose liability
without fault in other fields, such as products liability and the
master-servant relationship in general, indicates that such
liability is not against the moral structure of society.
SOME SUGGESTIONS

If the courts are unwilling to adopt this policy analysis
as a basis for decision, oil company liability might be increased by convincing the courts to adopt Professor Leidy's
"Iindependent calling" test in distinguishing between servants
and independent contractors." This test would result in the
liability of the employer to the injured person except when
71. Gamble, Tort Liability of Oil Companies for Acts of Service Station Operators, 3 VAND. L. REV. 597 (1950).
72. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 MiCH. L. REv. 635, 370-1
(1930).
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the person employed is engaged in a business which is different from that of the employer. In this instance, the station
operator is engaged in selling the oil company's products,
and this is also the business of the oil company; therefore, the
company will usually be liable.
If the injury occurred when the operator was engaged in
a business different from that of the oil company, for example
selling cars,7" then the policy reasons for holding the company
would not be as strong. First, primary accident cost reductions would be more difficult because there would be some
externalization of costs resulting from inadequate knowledge
of the risks on the part of the oil companies. They would not
be in as good a position as the operator to evaluate the risks
of this different business, and, therefore, they would probably
improperly account for these costs. General deterrence would
thus be defeated. While the oil company would still have the
deep pocket, secondary accident cost reduction would also not
be as efficiently accomplished. Again the inability of the oil
company to evaluate the risks of this different business will
lead to unnecessary costs in insuring.
The control test, however, remains resilient and tenacious,
and one may have to work within that test. If so, plaintiff's
attorney might do well to note the approach used in Federal
Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc.7 4 an anti-trust decision.
The United States Supreme Court stated that Texaco holds
dominant economic power over their dealers and indicated
that such power is "inherent in the structure and economics of
the petroleum distribution system.'" This power derives essentially from the short term leases and supply agreements,
which the companies may also terminate because of the violation of any number of "housekeeping" provisions."8 In
1965, the twenty major oil companies owned or leased 160,000
of the 227,000 service station properties.7 7 It has been asserted
that the economic power resulting from the ownership of the
73. Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 48. This case involved this type of situation, but the oil company was held liable.
74. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
75. Id. at 226.
76. Id. at 227.
77. Hearings on Gasoline Marketing Practices before Subcommittee Number
Four on Distribution Problems of the House Select Committee on Small
Business, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1558 (1965).
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retailing facilities is used to compel dealer submission to
company policies as a condition for allowing him to continue
in business. 71 In addition, there are virtually no multi-brand
service stations in the United States today, although in 1925
such stations were the majority." This means that the refusal
by an oil company to renew a supply contract may lead to
economic disaster for the operator. The courts may be moved
from their fixation at the stage of the agreements in other
ways. Harold Brown, author of Franchising: Trap for the
0 contends that the trend is to eliminate all restricTrusting,"
tions in the franchise contract. Instead, the company can rely
on the inherent power of the termination clauses to control the
service station operators."1 He indicates that in the oil industry this result is accomplished through annual subleases
whereby the dealer is constantly subject to the oil companies'
economic power.8" This approach may then show the courts
that there is control inherent in this system of franchising.
OTHER FRANCHISES

The cases involving the liability of oil companies for the
torts of service station operators appear to constitute nearly
all of the case law which concerns the liability of a franchisor
for the torts of a franchisee. It would seem that someone must
have been injured by a fall on a slippery floor in a Mr. Donut
shop or a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet, yet cases in which
franchisors, other than oil companies, have been sued are virtually nonexistent. In the area of liability for the negligent
operation of motor vehicles by automobile salesmen apparently only one case has involved a suit against the automobile
company itself.8 3 In California the franchisors of dance studios have been held liable for damages resulting from breach
of contract and from violations of the California Dance Act
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1561.
Id. at 1558.
BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969).
Hearings on the Impact of Franchisingon Small Business before the Subcommittee on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1970).

82. Id.
83. Barton v. Studebaker Corp. of America, 46 Cal. App. 707, 189 P. 1025
(1920). See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 631 (1957).
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by their franchisees. s4 Generally, the law of the liability of a
franchisor for the torts of his franchisee is the law of the liability of oil companies for the torts of their service station
operators.
An examination of various franchisors' contracts, such
as, Mr. Donut of America, Inc., 85 Edie Adams' Cut and Curl
Salon and Wig Boutique," and Johnny's American Inn, Inc., s"
reveals contractual terms which give the franchisor the ability
to control the details of the operation of the franchise. The
Chevrolet Dealer Selling Agreement"8 provides, among other
things, that the franchisee must maintain customary business
hours, adopt a uniform accounting system, provide records of
sales and services, allow Chevrolet representatives to examine
these records, treat purchasers according to guidelines set
down by Chevrolet, perform car service and repair according
to Chevrolet specifications, and use certain signs of the company."9 The agreement also contains termination provisions
and disclaimers of agency similar to the oil companies' agreements." With all of these provisions, the battles over control
and estoppel which rage in the area of the oil companies are
noticeably absent in these other fields.
It seems that there is no tort litigation involving these
other types of franchisors because the franchisors have taken
steps to protect themselves from liability by providing financially responsible franchisees. It is a recommended practice
for the franchisors to require that before the franchisee can
commence business, he must acquire liability insurance for
84.

Holland v. Nelson, 5 Cal. App. 3d 308, 85 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Dist. Ct. App.
1970) ; Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr.
728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d
976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).

85. Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business before the Subcommittee on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 245 (1970).
86. Id. at 616.
87. Id. at 631.
88. Id. at 820. See also Dodge Direct Dealer Agreement, id., at 862-82.
89. Id. at 836-41.
90. Id. at 843-844, 854.
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personal injuries and property damage. 1 This appears to be
the general practice, and the minimum amounts of insurance
required seem to be high enough to satisfy most claims. 2 For
example, Johnny's American Inn, Inc. requires minimum
public liability insurance of $250,000 per person and $500,000
per loss. 3 The automobile companies may achieve the same
result through contractual provisions requiring that their
dealers maintain a certain minimum amount of net working
capital and net worth necessary for the dealer to carry on his
business. 4 An injured person, therefore, has no reason to sue
the franchisor for he usually has a convenient and financially
responsible defendant in the franchisee.
The franchisors in attempting to insulate themselves from
liability have provided this financially responsible defendant.
As has been suggested, if the oil companies are held liable,
they too would probably resort to similar provisions. As it
is, they benefit by having financially irresponsible operators."
If the operator does not have to account for these accident
costs because he does not have to insure, he will be able to pay
a higher rent and higher prices for oil company products. In
order to accept the franchise agreement the operator would
not have to demand lower prices or more services from the
oil company as he would if he had to account for these costs.
Thus only the oil company benefits under the present system.
They can charge higher prices to their operators, and under
the control and estoppel tests in most courts they have a good
opportunity to defeat an injured person's claim.
CONCLUSION

The tests of control and estoppel which the courts use to
solve the problems of oil company liability ignore the function
of loss allocation, which the courts perform, and in a majority
of cases have led the courts to the wrong result from the policy
standpoint.
91. Id. at 282.
92. Id. at 245 (Mr. Donut), 616 (Edie Adams'); Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,
248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
93. Id. at 631.
94. Id. at 836 (Chevrolet Dealer Selling Agreement § 7); 869 (Dodge Direct
Dealer Agreement § 7).
95. MORRIs, supra note 65.
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An analysis of this problem in terms of Calabresi's suggested goals of a system of accident law indicates that the
least desirable result is leaving the loss on the injured person.
By holding the oil company liable, however, these goals will be
accomplished. Presently, many of the service station operators are potentially insolvent, and these goals will not be
served by placing the loss on them. A comparison of the oil
company and solvent service station operators indicates that
the goal of reducing the number and severity of accidents
would be served by placing the loss on either one. In the
area of reduction of social costs, the oil company appears to
be the better loss bearer because it may use its economic power
to negotiate with insurance companies for insurance at minimum cost. It is difficult to determine in the light of this factor
and the companies' ability to inspect and set operating standards whether the station operator's constant contact with his
specific station enable him to be able significantly to better
evaluate the risk so as to be better able to insure at a lower
cost than the oil company.
It appears, however, that a market determination of
which party is the better loss bearer will result from placing
this loss on the oil companies. If they follow the practice of
other franchisors, in order to protect themselves they would
force the operator to be financially responsible. If this leads
to a breakdown in this type of products distribution system,
then it would indicate that the operators are not the better
loss bearers. The oil company would then have to decide if the
benefits which they derive from the present marketing system outweigh the costs of these accidents. If so, they will
bear the costs and continue the franchise system.
Finally, short of the courts adopting this type of policy
analysis, a test which seems to lead to the proper results would
be the "independent calling" test. This test would define the
limits of the oil companies' liability, and if used by the courts
to distinguish between servants and independent contractors,
it would result in the oil companies' liability in most cases.
Given the unanimity in applying the control and estoppel
tests, however, it appears that it might be necessary to emphahttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss1/10
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size the control "inherent in the structure and economics of
the petroleum distribution system" 96 and the discrepancies
which exist between the oil companies and other types of
franchisors.
THOMAS
96.

TONER

FTC v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 75.
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